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Abstract
We analyze a two-stage game where capacity-constrained electricity
generators first choose how much capacity they make available and then
compete in a uniform-price auction. We study how capacity withhold-
ing can be used strategically to enforce market power and how uniform
auctions in the price game change the results of capacity constrained
competition models. The uniform auction procedure gives strong in-
centives to capacity restriction. At equilibrium, however, power short-
age never occurs.
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1 Introduction
Since the 90’s, an increasing number of countries have organized wholesale
markets for electricity. Although the market rules may differ from country
to country, the trading of electricity is generally based on uniform price
auction mechanisms, that is a system where every active producer receives
the same price for every unit of output he is called for, as long as his bids
were lower than the clearing price computed by the market operator (see
von der Fehr and Harbord (1998) and Newbery (1999) for a comprehensive
description of several international examples).
Though auctions in electricity markets have already been studied by
several economists, yet an important feature of spot trading is the capac-
ity availability decision. In fact, for technical reasons, such as equipment
maintenance or failures, the installed capacity may not work at maximum
operating level and the spot market rules oblige generators to announce
which plants they are willing to use together with their offer prices. Beside
technical reasons, the so-called “capacity declarations” also offer a strate-
gic instrument for firms: by restricting capacity, operators can benefit from
scarcity rents.1 As Green (2004) explain: "[...] The term “withholding”
is often used to describe the way in which generators could exploit market
power. “Economic withholding” implies that a plant would not offer its
output as soon as the market price was high enough to cover its costs of
doing so, but would wait until the price had risen above its costs. “Physical
withholding” implies that the plant’s output is not made available to the
market at any price. In both cases, the plants that are withheld from the
market will generate less, and are likely to make less money, but the strat-
egy can increase the company’s profits by raising the price received by its
other units." Our aim is to show that endogenizing capacity as a strategic
variable not only takes into account real technological constraints, but also
helps to understand when withholding production results in pricing above
marginal cost, a possible outcome of the uniform price auction. Thus we
study a two-stage game where capacity constrained electricity generators
first choose how much capacity they make available and then compete in a
uniform-price auction.
Assessing whether generators withhold capacity is an intriguing issue for
real electricity markets, though proving it is a difficult task. Wolak and
Patrick (1997) study the UK Pool during the first five years of its opera-
tion and affirm that capacity bids are a more “high-powered” instrument
than price bids to manipulate spot market prices. By analyzing half-hourly
bids and availability declarations, they conclude that National Power and
PowerGen were strategically withholding capacity to increase prices. How-
1Notice that short-term capacity availability decisions are substantially different from
the long-term investment as modelled by von der Fehr and Harbord (1997), Castro-
Rodriguez et alii (2001).
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ever, Green (2004) argues that availability figures do not provide conclusive
evidence of strategic capacity withholding by British generators from 1990
to 2001,.and concludes that to look for this kind of evidence, prices and
generation patterns must be examined.
Joskow and Kahn (2001) perform a simulation analysis showing that
capacity withholding in the Californian spot market during the summer 2000
can explain - at least partially - the observed price increase. They find a
substantial gap between maximum possible levels of generation and observed
levels at peak hours. This gap cannot be explained by the California System
Operator’s requirements for ancillary services or by reasonable estimates of
forced outages. Joskow and Kahn conclude that there is sufficient empirical
evidence that the high observed prices reflect market power exercised by
withholding capacity. On the contrary, Harvey and Hogan (2001a) cast
some doubts about the empirical analyses assessing strategic withholding by
the Californian companies; in particular, they criticize Joskow and Kahn’s
work in that they use publicly available data only. According to Harvey
and Hogan, the public information do not reflect the real status of capacity
usage and do not show whether capacity has been used to generate energy,
or to provide ancillary services, or to alleviate congestion and to balance
generation and load, as the system operator might require. Harvey and
Hogan’s view is not shared by the California Public Utilities Commission,
whose investigation has concluded that five independent power producers
- Duke, Dynergy, Mirant, Reliant and AES/Williams - withheld capacity
from their California plants.2
Several theoretical papers show that generators are able to keep whole-
sale prices high as compared to their generation costs.3 Von der Fehr and
Harbord (1993) develop a sealed-bid multiple-unit auction model with par-
ticular reference to the UK Pool operating during the 90’s. They show that
inefficient pricing is the most likely outcome even if there is no collusive
behavior. Motivated by the recent reform of the UK system, where each
active producer is paid his own bid, and by the Californian debate in favor
of price-differentiated mechanisms, Fabra et alii (2005) generalize the model
proposed by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and compare discriminatory
and uniform auctions in terms of prices and productive efficiency. Through
comparative statics results, the authors show that the pricing mechanism
in the electricity industry is heavily affected by the existence of capacity
constraints in generation, like in Bertrand-Edgeworth models.4 Fabra et alii
2California Public Utilities Commission, “Wholesale Generator Investigation Report”,
available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov.
3We do not refer here to the set of studies that use standard Industrial Organization
models of competition based on continuous and differentiable cost functions, like Bolle
(1992), Green and Newbery (1992), Green (1996, 1999), Newbery (1998), Baldick and
Hogan (2001).
4The impact of firms’ limited generation capacity on bidding strategies is further ex-
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(2005) provide much of the results we use to characterize the equilibrium of
the price game, at which capacity are exogenously given.
The strategic use of available capacity in two-stage games with uniform
auctions has been analyzed by Le Coq (2002) in a duopoly model and by
Ubeda (2004) in the more general uniform versus discriminatory auction
debate. Considering all possible cost/available capacity configurations, both
Le Coq and Ubeda conclude that firms will generally have incentives to
withhold capacity. However, our paper differs from theirs in that we focus
on a specific cost/installed capacity configuration. In our model, a generator
is not obliged to declare all installed capacity as available, but decides on the
amount of MW of electricity that is available. Hence the available capacity
is an endogenous variable while the installed one is exogenous. The analysis
of installed capacities, which may be larger than the “available” capacities,
allow to explain clearly whether generators exert market power by declaring
unavailable some production units.
Although we find multiple subgame perfect equilibria that cannot be
eliminated by Pareto-dominance, all the outcomes are characterized by mar-
ket price at the highest attainable value and most of them by production
below installed capacity. Nevertheless, there is no power shortage, as long
as the penalty rules that apply to generators when excess demand occurs do
not give the wrong incentive to decrease capacity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to model setting.
After a brief explanation of the price game (Section 3), we analyze the
capacity choice (Section 4). Section 5 compares our results to those of
capacity-constrained competition models and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model setting
To analyze competition in electricity markets, it is necessary to clarify the
assumptions on supply and demand, but also on market rules and regulatory
instruments. In what follows, we detail our hypotheses: Section 2.1 describes
supply and demand characteristics, while Section 2.2 is devoted to market
rules.
plored by Otto López (2000) who analyses a market where generators, submitting different
bids for each next-day hourly market (like in Spain since1998), face a quasi certain de-
mand. Otto López shows that, for a certain range of low costs, the firms bid strictly
less under capacity constraint than in the unconstrained case. The expected equilibrium
price, however, will not necessarily be close to the marginal cost because of capacity con-
straints. García-Martin (1999) refers to the same type of model to analyze the effects
of the stranded costs investments recovrement and shows that this mechanism acts as a
countervailing force to market power and high prices.
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2.1 Supply and demand characteristics
Supply There are two generators labeled a and b, with installed capacity
Ki (i = a, b). The technology exhibits constant marginal costs ci (i = a, b)
for production levels less than capacity, while production above capacity is
infinitely costly. Arbitrarily, we assume ca < cb and, whenever applicable,
we use the parameter ζ = pˆ−capˆ−cb > 1 to measure firm a’s cost advantage (pˆ
is the price cap; see Section 2.2 below). We also assume- for pure conve-
nience - asymmetric installed capacities Ka > Kb, which means that the
low generation-cost firm is also the one with the higher installed capac-
ity. An example is given by hydro versus thermal electricity. Costs as well
as installed capacity are common knowledge, which is broadly the case in
wholesale electricity markets.
Each generator is not obliged to declare capacity as totally available:
when firm i announces that Ki(≤ Ki) is available, she must be ready to
produce up to Ki if the market operator dispatches her. The technical
reason is that it is costly to prepare and to operate a generation plant. Since
withholding capacity can also enforce anticompetitive behavior, we assume
that firm i incurs no cost in declaring the availability of Ki. Generation
costs will only be paid for the output effectively produced.
We also assume that power shortage can occur only if provoked by firms:
the installed capacity is sufficient to provide the highest demand level.
Demand Demand D is totally inelastic: this mainly reflects the fact that
hourly demand forecast announced by the Independent System Operator5
(henceforth, ISO) are fixed quantities.6
For a given demand D, supply can appear as small or large ex-ante
or ex-post. Ex-ante, demand is to be compared with the real or technical
or natural generation capacities Ka and Kb. Ex-post, demand has to be
compared with the alleged or declared or strategic capacities Ka and Kb.
Of course, because of the constraintsKi ≤ Ki for i = a, b, the ex-post regime
can only be a subset of the ex-ante regime.
2.2 Market rules
Bid Formats In energy markets, generators’ bids must respect the legal
format imposed by the system operator. For instance, price announcements
are limited to a finite number of values by pre-defined ticks. On the con-
trary, no legal constraint is imposed on the quantity of energy the generator
5As we do not consider transmission problems, there is no reason to distinguish be-
tween the system operator, usually in charge of transmission congestion, and the market
operator.
6Eligible customers are allowed to announce demand bids, which represent their maxi-
mum individual willingness to pay. As a result, the aggregate demand should exhibit some
elasticity, but actually, observation shows that the price elasticity of demand is very low.
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is willing to provide; but, as we have said, technical constraints as start-up
cost or multi-unit equipment may cause discontinuity in the production de-
cisions. We neglect these legal and technical constraints and consider price
and capacity as continuous variables, ruling out the problem of optimization
in integer numbers.
Price-cap We suppose that there exists an upper limit to bids, denoted by
pˆ that can be interpreted as a regulated maximum price or as the reservation
price of consumers as estimated by the ISO.
Determination of the system marginal price We limit our attention
to uniform-price auctions; at equilibrium, all participants are paid the same
unit price, that is the clearing price or the “system marginal price” (SMP).
When bids are ordered by increasing values, the SMP is the value of the
last bid necessary to equate demand and supply. When demand is low, the
clearing price is the bid Bi fixed by the low bidder. For a medium demand,
the clearing price is fixed by the firm with the higher generation capacity.
With a high demand, the equilibrium price is the bid fixed by the high
bidder. It results that, depending on the declared capacities Ka and Kb,
and depending on the demand value D, we have very different conditions
of price competition. In all cases, however, demand is allocated first to the
lower bidder and the higher bidder serves the residual, if any.
Tie-breaking rules If firms announce the same price p, we assume that
generators are despatched proportionally to their available capacity, which
means that the gross revenue of firm i is pD
KiP
jKj
.7 We also consider, as an
alternative rule, the efficient tie-breaking mechanism, under which whenever
the two generators submit equal offer prices, the low cost firm is called into
operation first, and the competitor is left serving the residual demand.
Shortage penalty What occurs in the DE regime where demand cannot
be totally supplied? Under pure market mechanisms, the price should be pˆ,
each firm i receiving revenue pˆKi, and demand being rationed. Shortages in
California during Summer 2000 have shown that the political consequences
of black-outs are dramatic, hence market rules should be designed to avoid
them. In fact, the so-called “load-serving entities”, responsible for retailing,
must pay some penalties for unserved demand once the real-time dispatch
has occurred (Crampton and Sotft, 2005). This is a motivation to analyze
the impact of alternative penalty rules on firms’ withholding strategies, as-
suming that generators are responsible for serving final demand, since in our
model we do not consider distributors. We assume that, when a shortage
7This is for instance the rule used by the Spanish ISO.
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occurs, the ISO requires firms to sell all their available capacity at a priceep ≤ bp and to pay a fixed penalty S.
Notice that our hypothesis on the shortage penalty is different from
the so-called capacity payments, whose impact is considered, for instance,
in von der Fehr et alii (1997). The capacity payment rule makes firms’
profit an increasing function of firm’s own capacity and a decreasing function
of the difference between demand and the total declared capacity. This
reward scheme can create incentives for collusion and free riding8, whereas
our penalty rule makes withholding unattractive.
2.3 Timing of the game
In spot markets, suppliers submit pairs (Bi,Ki) that give the minimum
unit price Bi at which supplier i is willing to produce up to the associ-
ated quantity Ki MW. However, if price bids can adjust very quickly to
any information relevant to competition strategies, capacity cannot. Due to
technological inflexibility, firms must plan their capacity availability before
submitting simultaneously price and quantity bids. Hence we assume that,
even if market rules oblige generators to submit day-ahead price and quan-
tity bids at the same time, firms actually decide quantities before deciding
on prices. The bidder can commit to a price almost instantaneously while
he needs technical lags before committing to capacities. For this reason, we
consider realistic to keep separate the decision on Ki and the decision on
Bi. Additionally, we assume that the choice of Ki is observable by j before
choosing Bj . This can be justified by bidders’ expertise and by the informa-
tion disseminated by market operators.9 We focus on capacity availability
decisions, neglecting the duration of suppliers’ offer prices. The latter topic
has been quite extensively studied in the literature on electricity auctions
(see in particular García-Diaz and Marín, 2003 and Fabra et alii, 2005).
At the time where generators decide on the capacity availability and
price bids, demand forecast is a crucial variable. We assume that firms
know the value of D when choosing capacities and prices; therefore, they
8“Capacity payments” are a feature of some electricity systems including Spain, Ar-
gentina and Australia. However, recently they have been widely criticised (see Newbery,
1997, Wolak and Patrick, 1997) and abandoned in the newly-designed England and Wales
pool. In order to avoid shortage, other systems, as the New-York ISO and the PJM In-
terconnection, have organised decentralised capacity markets and imposed capacity oblig-
ations (and penalties if those obligations are unattended) to load-serving entities. The
Colombian ISO is considering to organise reliability contracts which include penalties for
those bids that are not backed by adequate generation capacity.
9For instance, since July 2001, the Californian ISO makes publicly available a list of all
power plants located in the State that are not operational due to planned or unplanned
outages. The snapshot of the “non-operational generating units” is updated four times a
day, on the basis of the information communicated by generators. The list comprises very
detailed information on the unavailable plants, including the name of the generation unit
which is being reported upon.
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play a two-stage game:
i) firms a and b announce the available capacitiesKa ≤ Ka andKb ≤ Kb;
ii) knowing these capacities, the firms submit their bids Ba and Bb.
Given the capacity and price bids, the ISO matches demand and supply
and generators are paid.
3 Price competition
In this section, we determine the price equilibria corresponding to each
regime of demand, given the available capacity declared by the generators.
This is a necessary step before we can focus on the stage of competition in
capacity. Lemma 1 describes the equilibrium profits of the price competition
game that we consider at the capacity choice stage, most of the results lean
on Proposition 1 proven by Fabra et alii (2005). In this latter work, the
results focus on critical thresholds of the market demand, which is treated
as a random variable. In our model, as D is deterministic, it is useful to
restate the price competition game outcomes in order to make clear the role
of capacity availability and ex-post demand regimes:
Lemma 1 The equilibrium profits of the price competition game are as
follows:
i) for Ka < (D−Kb) and Kb < D, there is ex-post excess demand
¡
DE
¢
;
firms’ profits are:
πi = (ep− ci)Ki − S i = a, b ep ≤ bp, S ≥ 0. (1)
ii) for (D −Kb) ≤ Ka < ζζ−1(D−Kb) and Kb < D, there is ex-post high
demand
¡
DH
¢
; firms’ mixed-strategy profits are:
Eπa = (bp− ca)(D −Kb) , Eπb = (bp− cb)(D −Ka) (2)
iii) for ζζ−1(D−Kb) ≤ Ka < D and Kb ≥ D, there is ex-post medium de-
mand regime with the high-cost firm b having the capacity advantage
¡
DMb
¢
;
firms’ profits are:
πa = (pˆ− ca)Ka , πb = (pˆ− cb)(D −Ka) (3)
iv) for Kb < Dζ < D ≤ Ka, there is ex-post medium demand regime with
the low-cost firm a having the capacity advantage (DMa ); firms’ profits are:
πa = (pˆ− ca)(D −Kb) , πb = (pˆ− cb)Kb (4)
v) for Kb ≥ Dζ and Ka > D there is ex-post low demand regime DL;
firms’ profits are:
πa = (cb − ca)D , πb = 0 (5)
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Proof. See the Appendix.
In the Appendix we show that for Ka ≤ ζζ−1 (D −Kb) there exist two set
of pure strategy equilibria that are outcome equivalent to DMa and D
M
b . The
multiplicity of equilibria in the high demand regime creates some difficulties
for the analysis of capacity choice. Hereafter, we assume that in the ex-
post high demand regime, firms play in mixed strategies and their expected
profits are given by equation (2) to preserve firms’ symmetry.10 Those profits
corresponds to the limit case in which the high cost firm never bids the
price cap and the industry profits are minimized (see Fabra et alii, 2005,
Proposition 1)11: this would discourage firms from creating ex-post high
demand regime.
Price game under efficient tie-breaking Under the assumption that
the generators’ marginal costs are observable, an alternative rule to break
ties is efficiency: when firms bid the same price, the low cost firm is called
into operation first, and the competitor is left serving the residual demand.
In our model, the introduction of the efficient tie-breaking rule does not
affect the equilibria of the price game, as the following shows:
Lemma 2 When the efficiency rule is used to break ties in offer prices, the
price equilibrium and the profits for all the competition regimes remain as
in Lemma 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Efficient tie-breaking is not a remedy against high mark-up in the price
game, as potential advantages from calling first into operation the low cost
firm are offset by the uniform price mechanism with inelastic demand.
The plane of the declared capacities (Ka,Kb) is partitioned in five zones.
Figure 1 summarizes firms’ profits depending on the values of Ka and Kb
that we will consider in the capacity game below.
10Le Coq (2002) considers the two possible pure strategy equilibria.
11 In the Appendix we show that a possible outcome of the high demand price game
in mixed strategy is the Bertrand equilibrium (see Corollary 1), but as both generators
must be despatched to serve the demand, the least efficient firm is not excluded from the
market. In some sense, the inefficient firm is protected by the efficient one against losses
due to low bids. This result should be taken into account when econometricians try to
evaluate the cost function using bid records. We also show (see Corollary 2) that capacities
play an important role in the characterization of the first-order stochastic dominance of
the mixed strategies.
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Figure 1: Profits as functions of capacity declarations
4 Capacity choice
To analyze the capacity game when demand is known by the operators at
the moment they announce their capacity availability, we start describing
the choice process when no generator is ex-ante constrained by capacity, and
then we extend the analysis to the cases of ex-ante medium and high demand
forecast. Recall that for the game in capacity, we assume that adding-up
the installed capacity of each firm is sufficient to provide the whole demand,
and that the low generation cost firm a is also for convenience the one with
the highest installed capacity.
4.1 Low demand
We first consider the case where the ISO announces that demand will be
D < Kb, which means that both firms have enough capacity to supply the
whole demand individually.
As we can infer from Figure 1,
• if firm a thinks b will declare Kb ≥ D, for Ka < D she will be in a
DMb regime with profit (bp − ca)Ka and for Ka ≥ D, she will be in a
DL regime with profit (cb − ca)D which is independent from Ka;
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• if firm a thinks that b will declare Dζ < Kb < D, withKa < D−Kb, she
will be in the DE regime, earning πa = (ep−ca)Ka−S, which increases
with Ka and gives firm a the incentive to increase her capacity up to
Ka = D − Kb. With D − Kb ≤ Ka < ζζ−1 (D −Kb), she will be in
the DH regime, earning Eπa = (bp − ca)(D − Kb). For D > Ka >
ζ
ζ−1 (D −Kb) , she ends-up in a medium regime with profit equal to
πa = (bp−ca)Ka. Finally, increasing its capacity, forKa ≥ D she will be
in the equivalent of a low demand regime with profit (cb−ca)D. Clearly,
when Dζ ≤ Kb < D firm a attains the highest profit by declaring a
capacity above the line Ka =
ζ
ζ−1 (D −Kb) . Within this zone, firm a
earns πa = (bp− ca)Ka which increases with Ka;
• if firm a thinks that b will declare Kb = Dζ , with 0 ≤ Ka < D she
will be in an excess demand or high demand regime earning at most
πa = (bp− ca)(D−Kb).With Ka ≥ D, she will be in a DL-like regime,
earning πa = (cb − ca)D.
• if firm a thinks that b will declare Kb < Dζ , with Ka < D −Kb, she
will be in the DE regime, earning πa = (ep−ca)Ka−S, which increases
with Ka and gives firm a the incentive to increase her capacity up to
Ka = D−Kb.With D−Kb < Ka < D, she will be in the DH regime,
earning Eπa = (bp − ca)(D −Kb), and for larger values Ka > D, she
will be in a DMa regime, with profit πa = (bp− ca)(D −Kb).
The comparison of the profit values allows to establish that if firm a
thinks that b will declare Kb > Dζ , she can avoid fierce competition by
choosing D− ; for Kb ≤ Dζ , the low demand regime is impossible, and firm
a bids any value above D −Kb.
Summarizing, the best response of firm a is as follows:
Ka(Kb) =
(
D −  if Kb ≥ Kb > Dζ
Ka ∈
£
D −Kb,Ka
¤
if Kb ≤ Dζ
where  is a positive number arbitrarily small (see Figure 2).12
12Recall that we treat capacity as a continuos variable. In real electricity markets,
choosing a capacity level equal to D −  can be realized by shutting down the smallest
production unit that ensures total production by the generator at a level slightly below
the announced demand.
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Figure 2: Ex-ante low demand. Firm a’s best response function
in the capacity subgame.
The best response function of firm b is slightly different.
• WhenKa > D, firm b will be in a low demand regime, earning nothing,
if he declares Kb ≥ Dζ ; for capacity below
D
ζ , firm b obtains a positive
profit, πb = (bp−cb)Kb, which is the medium demand regime with firm
a having the capacity advantage.
• If firm b thinks that a will declare Ka = D, with 0 ≤ Kb < D she will
be in a DMa regime earning πb = (bp − cb)Kb. With Kb ≥ D, she will
be in a DL regime, obtaining zero profit.
• When Ka < D, for Kb < D−Ka, she earns the excess demand profit,
that is πb = (ep− cb)Kb − S. Hence firm b has an incentive to increase
capacity. ForKb ≥ D−Ka, firm b earns Eπb = (bp−cb)(D−Kb) : this is
the profit she obtains with the price equilibrium in mixed strategies in
the high demand regime, as well as with the price equilibrium in pure
strategies under the medium regime, where firm b has the capacity
advantage.
We can now characterize firm b’s best response (see Figure 3):
Kb(Ka) =
½ D
ζ −  if Ka ≥ Ka ≥ D
Kb ∈
£
D −Ka,Kb
¤
if Ka < D
12
Figure 3: Ex-ante low demand. Firm b’s best response in the
capacity subgame.
Consequently, we can establish the following:
Proposition 1 If none of the generators is naturally capacity constrained
(D < Kb < Ka), there are three families of equilibria for the capacity choice
game:
i) (K∗a ,K
∗
b ) = {Ka,KbÁKa < D, Kb ≤ Dζ , Ka +Kb ≥ D}
ii) K∗a ≥ D, K∗b = Dζ − 
iii) K∗a = D − , K∗b ≥ Dζ
Proof. The proof is directly obtained by intersecting the two best response
functions.
Table 1 summarizes the results of Proposition 1.13
13Table 1 (as well as the following Tables 2 and 3) does not consider ex-ante “very-high-
demand regime” since we have excluded this case by hypothesis.
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Table 1. Ex-ante low demand: subgame perfect equilibria
In type i) equilibria, we are in an ex-post high demand regime. The
two other sets of equilibria give medium demand regime. In type ii) with
firm a having an advantage in capacity, the expected profits are respectively
π∗a = (bp − ca)³ ζ−1ζ ´D and π∗b = (bp − cb)Dζ . In type iii) equilibria, profits
are π∗a = (bp− ca)D , π∗b = 0.
It is unfortunately impossible to eliminate some of the equilibria by a
Pareto-dominance argument: each generator is better-off when the other one
has the advantage in capacity and fixes the SMP at bp. Moreover, generator
i prefers to sell all capacity in the DMj regime than earning the D
H profit
with only one fraction of the demand.
These remarks imply that mixed strategies equilibria are very likely in
the capacity game and there is a strong incentive for generators to agree on
market sharing. If the players can coordinate their capacity bids somewhere
in the set K∗a +K
∗
b = D, generator a who has a cost advantage can use the
credible threat to bid K∗a = D that guarantees at worst πa = (cb − ca)D
in order to obtain a capacity advantage and the consequent profit advan-
tage. Consequently she will deny any agreement such that K∗a ≤ cb−caep−ca D =³
ζ−1
ζ
´
D. All these implicit or explicit agreements are obviously forbidden.
But the model shows that the high mark-up resulting from the uniform price
system gives strong incentives to transform a natural low demand regime into
a medium or high demand regime by withholding capacities.
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4.2 Medium and High demands
When Kb and Ka become binding, leading to natural medium and high
demand regimes, some equilibria of the preceding section are eliminated.
However, given that firm b’s reaction functions switches at Dζ , there is an
additional degree of freedom: even when “naturally” capacity-constrained
(i.e. Kb < D), the small firm can still have an actually unconstrained best
reaction function. For example, if the ISO announces an ex-ante medium
demand regime, the capacity constraint of generator b puts downward pres-
sure to firms’ choice only if Kb is lower than Dζ , as the following Proposition
points out (see Table 2):
Proposition 2 When the smaller generator is naturally constrained and
the larger is not (Kb < D < Ka), the equilibria of the capacity game are as
follows:
i) if Kb < Dζ , the equilibria are (K
∗
a ,K
∗
b ) = {Ka,KbÁKa < D, Kb < Dζ ,
Ka +Kb ≥ D};
ii) if Dζ ≤ Kb, there are three families of equilibria:
1) (K∗a ,K
∗
b ) = {Ka,KbÁKa < D,Kb ≤ Dζ ,Ka +Kb ≥ D}
2) K∗a ≥ D, K∗b = Dζ − 
3) K∗a = D − , Dζ < K∗b
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.
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*ˆ( )( )b ap c D K− −  
 
ex-ante demand 
 regime 
Table 2. Ex-ante medium demand: subgame perfect equilibria
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If the small generator is severely capacity constrained, only high demand
equilibria arise. If, despite the capacity constraint, firm b can bid Dζ (or
slightly less), all the outcomes of Proposition 1 are likely, though now, as
Kb < D, the medium demand regime with b having the capacity advantage
disappears.
In any case, the set of conflicting Pareto superior equilibria is reduced
to the segment K∗a +K
∗
b = D with K
∗
b ∈
£
0,Kb
¤
. If generators could agree
on capacity bids, we have seen at the end of Section 4.1 that firm a could
decline to bid K∗a ≤
³
ζ−1
ζ
´
D. As now Kb < Dζ , the efficient negotiation set
would be reduced at the advantage of a, since at worst she could obtain the
low regime profit.
Similarly to the previous case, when the ISO announces a natural DH
regime, only strategic high demand and excess demand regimes are feasible
ex-post. The definition of the equilibrium set depends on whether Kb lies
below or above Dζ .
Proposition 3 If both generators are naturally constrained (Kb < Ka <
D < Ka +Kb), the equilibria of the capacity game are:
(K∗a ,K
∗
b ) = {Ka,KbÁKa ≤ D, Kb ≤
n
min(Kb, Dζ )
o
, Ka +Kb ≥ D}
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.
Table 3 summarizes the results of Proposition 3.
High
a b aK K D K+ > >
ex-post regime High
capacity bids *
a aK K≤
{ }* min( , / )b bK K D ς≤
by a
capacity
withholding
        by b
likely
likely
fora
expected
profits
forb
*ˆ( )( )a bp c D K− −
))(ˆ( *ab KDcp −−
ex-ante demand
regime
Table 3. Ex-ante high demand: subgame perfect equilibria
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4.3 Capacity withholding
The outcome of our two-stage game suggests several results regarding the
strategic withholding of production capacity. When demand is “naturally”
low, the players face the largest set of possibilities. They could even restrict
their capacities to create artificial scarcity. Common sense suggest that, if
penalties for energy shortage were very severe (e.g. leaving generators with
zero profits), their interest would be to avoid an ex-post excess demand
regime. But, they also want to avoid the ex-post low demand regime that
would create fierce competition. Consequently, the outcome of the game
will be ex-post high or medium demand regimes. At least one of the players
withhold capacity; both do so in the ex-post high demand regime.
When the ISO announces an ex-ante medium demand regime, at equilib-
rium the ex-post high demand regime may occur, implying that generators
can strategically restrain capacity. If the low generator is severely con-
strained, the high demand equilibrium is the only possible outcome of the
game.
Clearly, absent any capacity cost, withholding is very likely as it is weakly
Pareto superior for firms. The only case where both firms might dump their
installed capacity on the market, by bidding K∗a = Ka and K
∗
b = Kb, is
when both generators are ex-ante constrained. However, firm b will surely
withhold if it can bid K∗b =
D
ζ (that is, when D > Kb ≥
D
ζ ). If there was no
cost-advantage (i.e. ζ = 1), this case would not arise.
More generally, when firms are symmetric, the set of equilibria is smaller.14
Although capacity withholding is still likely to occur, there is one exception:
when the ex-post regime is medium demand with a having the capacity ad-
vantage, firm b never restrains capacity. In fact, leaving a to be the market
leader reduces the opportunities for b to use capacity bids strategically.
As also Ubeda (2004) notices, when endogenizing capacity in a two-stage
game with uniform auctions and inelastic demand, there is multiplicity of
equilibria in terms of capacities, though uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium
price which is just the monopoly price, that is bp. However, it is impossible
to eliminate the subgame equilibria using a Pareto dominance argument.
Certainly, the setK∗a+K
∗
b = D (with or withoutK
∗
i ≤ Ki) is very attractive
for the generators. The range of capacities allows for the possibility of
using finite horizon trigger strategies to condition the subgame equilibrium
selection on the capacities chosen. This may possibly allow for collusion to
be enforced in equilibrium (see Decheneaux and Kovenock, 2004). However,
14One can easily see that, when both firms have symmetric unit costs equal to c, in the
price game, Betrand equilibria arise only when the demand is low. For medium and high
demand regimes, two symmetric subsets of pure strategy equilibria with one firm bidding
high and the competitor bidding low exist (the “medium-like” demand regime does not
exist). The mixed strategy equilibrium gives the same expected profit for both firms, and
the support of the prices over which firms randomize is [c, ep] . In the capacity game, firms’
reaction functions become symmetric and both switch at capacity values equal to D.
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the characterization of those equilibria goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, it appears that capacity bids are always sufficient to match the
demand: there is no incentive to organize voluntary power shortage. Actu-
ally, the results of Proposition 1 to 3 are independent of the values of ep and
S. Even in the case of a zero penalty, that is with ep = bp and S = 0, neither
firm has the incentive to create the excess demand regime. We conclude
that power shortage can only occur due to unexpected variation of demand
or costs, or to strategic long-term reasons (e.g. lack of investment) that are
beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Capacity competition and uniform auctions
That competition between capacity constrained firms generally yields a mar-
ket price above marginal cost and therefore positive profits is not surprising:
decreasing returns to scale soften price competition, as Bertrand-Edgeworth
(henceforth, B-E) models have shown. This is not the place to review sys-
tematically these models (for a very interesting synthesis, see Vives, 1999,
chapter 5). We simply recall here all the elements that can be useful in
comparing the results of our model to this literature.
The B-E models describe price competition, under the hypothesis that
1) the scale of the firm is given, as production decisions adjust to demand;
2) each firm takes into account that the competitor will not sell more than
its competitive profit-maximizing supply at the announces price. Therefore,
when one firm puts a price lower than the competitor’s, she gets all the
consumers that can buy at the set price; if she names a price higher than the
competitor’s, she can face a positive residual demand, since the competitor
sells the minimum between its residual demand and its competitive supply
(unlike the Bertrand competition model, where all consumers are served by
the low-price firm). The residual demand is then allocated according to a
rationing rule.
The B-E models predict that in those markets where firms have high
capacities relative to demand, there is a unique pure strategy market equi-
librium, the competitive price, whereas when firms are relatively small, there
exists only a mixed strategy equilibrium where high prices (stochastically)
prevail.1516 These models also predict that large firms will tend to set
low prices. These predictions could have been obtained also from Cournot
15The existence of mixed strategy equilibria is guaranteed under relatively weak as-
sumptions (demand continuous and equal to zero for large prices, strictly convex costs,
see Maskin, 1986, Allen and Hellwig, 1986).
16Moreno and Ubeda (2004) introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where
firms first build capacity, and then choose a reservation price at which they are willing to
supply their capacities.They show that in this new model every pure strategy equilibrium
yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
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games, in particular from the Kreps-Scheinkmann (1983) model, a two-stage
game where firms decide first their scale and then compete in prices to their
supply limits.
To which extent the predictions of our model coincide with those of the
capacity constrained literature?
First, all the subgame perfect equilibria we obtain are characterized by
productive inefficiency, in the sense that the price is not the competitive one
and does not correctly signal the profit from entry. Though in the price sub-
game we do obtain a result which is similar to the B-E models (indeed, when
demand is low, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost), this com-
petitive effect is offset by the capacity game. Moreover, the price subgame
exhibits multiple pure strategy equilibria under all the demand regimes, as
Fabra and alii (2005) have also shown.
Second, regarding allocative efficiency, although the multiplicity of equi-
libria prevents to conclude in full generality, in all the medium and medium-
high demand regimes, the large firm sets high prices, contrary to the findings
of B-E models. It implies that when the high-cost/low installed capacity firm
b is left without the capacity advantage, she will be called into operation
first, which is clearly undesirable. When ex-post high demand regime occurs,
allocative efficiency is even more difficult to assess: using the mixed-strategy
price equilibrium profits, we know that stochastically, the smaller firms can
bid larger prices; when the small firm is the inefficient one, then firm b sells
all of her capacity, so compromising allocative efficiency.
Third, although our model predicts a market price well above marginal
costs, both firms producing at capacity is only one of the possible outcomes
of the game: this equilibrium may arise in the ex-ante high demand regime,
that is when total installed capacity is small relative to the market size and
generators might not play strategically. This is similar to Kreps-Scheinkman
(1983) model.
The roots of these relative differences between our model and the capacity-
constrained competition literature have to be found in some crucial hypoth-
esis we have made. First, we model the price-stage game as a uniform
auction which has clearly an impact on the equilibrium price; second, and
most importantly, inelastic demand creates strong incentives for firms to bid
the highest attainable price. These assumptions strongly limit competition
for the residual demand and subgame perfect equilibria leave no room at all
to marginal cost pricing. Moreover, though in the high demand regime our
results on the relationship between large firms and high prices contradict
the stochastic dominance obtained in B-E models, this is less crucial in our
model, as it impacts allocative efficiency but not the market price (the SMP
is the price cap, whatever the bidding behavior of the firms).
Finally, notice that most of the subgame equilibria are not characterized
by firms producing at full capacity. In our model, firms decide on capacity
availability (which comes at zero costs) and not on their scale (that is,
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installed capacity) which would involve very high fixed costs. Therefore,
there is no discrepancy between the first-period (ex-ante) cost and the second
period (ex-post) cost, implying that there is no incentive to dump existing
capacity ex-post. Most importantly, in this model with uniform price and
inelastic demand, the equilibrium price jumps to the price-cap as soon as
at least one firm is unable to serve the demand. Therefore, firms withhold
capacity to earn scarcity rents. Moreover, the less the firms are “naturally”
capacity constrained (that is, in the ex-ante low and ex-ante medium demand
regimes), the stronger the incentive to withhold. This explains the main
difference between our results, especially in the ex-ante low demand regime,
and those of the literature on endogenous capacity choice.
5.1 Cost asymmetry
Cost asymmetry plays a very important role in capacity-constrained compe-
tition models. The only model that analyzes Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
with unit cost asymmetries is Deneckere and Kovenock (1996). As an appli-
cation of their characterization, they examine the Kreps-Sheinkmann model
of capacity choice followed by Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition with
elastic demand and efficient rationing. Obtaining closed-form solutions for
such a game is not trivial. Deneckere and Kovenock find that if the cost of ca-
pacity is negligible, when the high-cost firm’s capacity is not too large, the
low-cost firm best response coincides with the downward-sloping Cournot
best response. When the high cost firm’s capacity reaches a critical level
(which depends on the unit production costs of both firms), the low-cost
firm’s best response becomes flat and jumps to a capacity level that would
allow her to accommodate all demand and to price its rival out in the price
subgame, yielding a more competitive outcome, with capacities above the
Cournot level. Therefore, Cournot capacity levels only arise for limited cost
pairs/capacity combinations and demand functions: as compared with the
symmetric case, the low-cost firm has a greater incentive to price its rival
out.17 As the cost of capacity becomes larger, the range of unit cost up to
capacity for which Cournot does not hold becomes smaller.
The application developed by Deneckere and Kovenock is quite similar to
our ex ante low demand regime. Recall that if the capacity made available
by the high-cost firm is below a critical value (namely, Kb ≤ D/ζ), the
low-cost firm best reaction function is any capacity level above the value
that avoid shortages, and, for Kb > D/ζ, firm a accommodates almost all
the demand. The behavior of the high-cost firm is similar, but her reaction
function switches at the upper frontier of the Bertrand competition, that is
17 If the critical capacity level is below the intersection of the Cournot firms reaction func-
tions, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Also note that Deneckere and Kovenock
make ad hoc assumptions to avoid the high-cost firm having the same incentive to engage
in price competition.
20
at D/ζ.
The shape of the reaction functions in our model is different from De-
neckere and Kovenock because of the price subgame, as already stated. But
the most crucial point is that for values above the critical capacity of the
competitor, firms can avoid serving all the demand, because this would lead
to Bertrand competition. By undercutting slightly the demand level, they
create the asymmetry in capacity that ensures a high pay-off, since when one
firm is unable to serve all demand, the market price is equal to the price cap.
If in our model firms were symmetric, this anticompetitive effect would still
arise, but in a more limited space, as both firms’ reaction function would
switch at D.
On a more technical ground, unit-cost asymmetries also modify the sup-
port of the mixed strategies. As in Deneckere and Kovenock (1996), we find
that the support of mixed strategies is not the same for the two firms. An-
other analogy can be found with Allen and Hellwig (1993), who find that,
given the set of competitive prices at which market demand is equal to ag-
gregate production capacity, in equilibrium asymmetric firms do not charge
prices below the highest competitive price. This is similar to our result that
the system marginal price does not fall below the cost of the least efficient
firm.
5.2 Rationing
In B-E models, the rationing rule18 used to allocate residual demand can
drastically change 1) the region where a pure strategy equilibrium exists19
and 2) the characterization of mixed strategies.20 More drastically, the
Kreps-Sheinkmann (1983) result is not robust to departures from the effi-
cient rationing rule if the cost of capacity is zero. With proportional ra-
tioning, the equilibrium tends to be more competitive, with excess capacity
18Edgeworth used proportional rationing, that is the low-price firm serves the maxi-
mum between zero and a random sample of the consumer population (rationing is made
through a queuing system). Levitan and Shubick (1972) proposed the surplus-maximizing
or efficient rule, where the low price firm sells an amount equal to its competitive supply
and the high price firm serves the difference between the demand that clears at the high
price less the consumers satisfied by the low price firm.
19The region where a pure strategy equilibrium exists is restricted under efficient ra-
tioning.
20For instance, in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), with elastic demand, efficient rationing,
symmetric unit production costs and asymmetric (costly) capacities, firms expected profits
are asymmetric. The expected revenue of the largest firm is the reduced form of the
Cournot profits: this serves as foundation for Cournot equilibrium in the two stage games.
In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the larger firm charges higher prices in a stochastic
sense. Under the same hypothesis, but using efficient rationing, Vives (1999) shows that
the expected profits and the upper bound of the support are analogous to those we obtain
in the mixed strategy equilibria (except that in our model demand is inelastic, hence the
upper bound is the price cap, and that the profit will be net of marginal production costs).
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with respect to the Cournot level (Davidson and Deneckere, 1986). If the
cost of capacity is small, then the Cournot equilibrium cannot be an equilib-
rium outcome of the two stage game if the rationing rule is not the efficient
one (see Tirole, 1988, Section 5.7).
Our results are independent from the demand rationing assumption.
With uniform auctions the market price is unique, and the merit-order pro-
cedure only changes the allocation of supply. Allowing the firm that has
quoted the lowest price to serve first is equivalent to the efficient rationing
allocation. However one can easily verify that, with inelastic demand, effi-
cient and proportional rationing collapse into the same allocation rule. Also
notice that the excess demand regime is never an equilibrium outcome, then
we do not have to consider rules to ration unserved customers.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis provides interesting insights into the functioning of electricity
spot markets. We have shown that market power enforced by strategic
withholding is quite likely when the ISO announces ex-ante low and medium
demand regimes. Given that ex-ante there is excess capacity, at least one
firm withholds capacity and this opportunistic behavior creates artificially
high mark-ups that do not reflect scarcity rents. The uniform pricing rule
makes even more appealing the gains from capacity withholding: when firms
restrict capacity, the SMP attains its maximum level, and so do scarcity
rents. However, this strategic behavior does not result in black-outs.
Market design rules, such as the uniform auction, as well as market
characteristics, such as demand inelasticity, can facilitate capacity with-
holding by generators. To this extent, an interesting extension of the model
would be to compare incentives to withhold capacity under alternative auc-
tion formats, namely considering a price subgame where firms are paid the
price they bid, like in discriminatory auctions. However, the task of analyz-
ing withholding in electricity markets must include the interaction between
spot trading and other markets: in particular, one has to consider whether
capacity is declared unavailable because of strategic withholding or for tech-
nical reason, or with the intent to provide ancillary services, or because it is
constrained down due to transmission congestion or environmental output
restrictions.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Excess demand regime DE When total supply is insufficient to serve
the market (D > Ka + Kb), firms profits are calculate according to the
shortage penalty rule (see Section 2.2).
High demand regime DH
Equilibria in pure strategies Referring to Lemma 1 in Fabra et alii
(2005), equilibria in pure strategies are
i) if Ka ≤ ζζ−1 (D −Kb) , there exist two symmetric sets of equilibria in pure
strategies, where the low cost firm bids the price cap and the competitor
bids below a given threshold; one set of equilibria is:
B∗a ∈ [0, γHa ], B∗b = bp (6)
πa = (bp− ca)Ka, πb = (bp− cb)(D −Ka). (7)
where γHa
def
= cb + (bp− cb)(D −Ka)Kb > ca, and the second set is:
B∗a = bp, B∗b ∈ [0, γHb ] (8)
πa = (bp− ca)(D −Kb), πb = (bp− cb)Kb (9)
where γHb
def
= ca + (pˆ− ca)
D −Kb
Ka
> cb.
ii) if Ka >
ζ
ζ−1(D −Kb) there exist one set of equilibria where firm b bids
the price cap and firm a bids below a given threshold. For values of Ka >
ζ
ζ−1(D −Kb), it is easy to check that γHb < cb; Therefore, there is only one
set of equilibria, described by equations (6) and (7), where firm b bids high.
Equilibria in mixed strategies Equilibria in mixed strategies are
derived by Fabra et alii (2005), in the proof of Proposition 1, to which we
add two additional results.
Corollary 1 The system marginal price cannot be lower than the marginal
cost of the least-efficient firm.
Proof. In the high demand regime, the SMP is fixed by the highest bidder.
Even if firm b can bid on the interval [ca, cb] with a positive probability, the
SMP will be above cb with zero probability, since firm a bids below the
marginal cost of the competitor with zero probability.
Corollary 2 Ka < Kb is a sufficient condition for Ga(B) ≤ Gb(B) ∀B.
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Proof. Straightforward calculations show that Ka < (>)Kb ⇐⇒ δa > (<
)δb. Under the hypothesis ca < cb, it is always true that for B < bp:
B − cabp− ca > B − cbbp− cb (10)
HenceKa < Kb is sufficient to determine the first order stochastic dominance
Ga(B) ≤ Gb(B).
Medium demand regime DMb When Kb ≥ D > Kb, drawing on the
Lemma 1 proven by Fabra and alii (2005), we can state that price equilibria
of the medium demand regime are B∗b = pˆ, B
∗
a ∈ [0, γMa ], where γMa
def
=
cb + (pˆ− cb)D−KaD > ca. All the price equilibria give the same profits πa =
(pˆ− ca)Ka, πb = (pˆ− cb)(D −Ka).
Medium demand regime DMa Similarly to the previous case, when
Ka > D > Kb and Kb ≤ Dζ , the equilibria are B∗a = pˆ, B∗b ∈ [0, γMb ], where
γMb
def
= ca+(pˆ− ca)
D −Kb
D
> cb. Firms’ profits are: πa = (pˆ− ca)(D−Kb),
πb = (pˆ− cb)Kb.
Low demand regime DL In the ex-post low demand situation, as the
firms propose a perfectly homogeneous good, we have pure Bertrand com-
petition (see again Fabra et alii, Lemma 1). Recalling that the parameter
ζ = pˆ−capˆ−cb > 1 measures firm a’s cost advantage, one can easily check that
Kb > Dζ is equivalent to (pˆ−ca)(D−Kb) < (cb−ca)D or γMb < cb.Thus when
Ka > D > Kb and Kb > Dζ , given that γ
M
b < cb, firm b should bid below
her marginal cost to be in the market. Therefore, firm a will not consider
this bid as a credible threat. Firm a undercuts the rival’s cost by bidding
cb− and the equilibrium outcome is the Bertrand equilibrium. Equilibrium
bids are B∗a = cb − ε,B∗b = cb and profits πa = (cb − ca)D, πb = 0.21
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Under the low demand regime, the efficient firm does not need to undercut
her competitor’s bids to obtain the whole demand. Equilibrium profits are
the same as in Lemma 1.
Under medium demand regime, for Ka > D > Kb, firms’ profits are like
in (??), except for Ba = Bb, where we now have:
πERa = (Ba − ca)D , πERb = 0 if Ba = Bb (11)
21 In real markets, ε is the smallest tick below cb fixed by the rules of the market. Here,
we simply assume that it is an arbitrary small number, so that the low-cost firm a wins
the whole market and the SMP is cb. In markets where a tick is enforced, we would have
B∗a =Max{cb− ε, ca} = SMP. The existence of the tick could sensitively lower generator
a’s profit, especially when the difference between the marginal costs is not very large.
27
where ER refers to the efficiency rule. The profits in (11) coincide with
those earned by the firms when Ba < Bb, hence the price equilibrium is
unchanged.
In the high demand regime, when firms play pure strategies, bidding the
same price as the competitor is a strongly dominated strategy for generator
b and a weakly dominated strategy for generator a (both when Ka > Kb
and when Ka < Kb). Therefore, we can eliminate it. Finally, adopting the
efficiency rule does not affect mixed strategy equilibria when calculated on
a continuous support, because the joint probability of ending up on a single
point is of zero measure (this is no longer true when there exists a legal tick
that constraints the choice of the bids’ format).
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